Automated Syllabus of Game Theory Papers

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Papers curated by hand, summaries and taxonomy written by LLMs.

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Optimal Decision Making Under Uncertainty

> Optimizing Security Investments & Lobbying Channels

>> Optimal Security Investment Based on Breach Probability Function
  • Carefully consider the properties of the security breach probability function when studying the optimal security investment for a single agent, as it can determine whether the optimal investment increases with the vulnerability of the agent and the expected loss, and ultimately affect the overall security of the network. (Lelarge 2012)
>> Quantifying Indirect Business-Politics Interactions via Advanced Analytics
  • Carefully distinguish between direct and indirect lobbying channels when analyzing the relationship between business and politics, as indirect lobbying can be more challenging to detect and quantify due to its non-transparent nature. (DellaVigna et al. 2016)

> Game Theory Applications in Economics and Social Sciences

>> Addressing Complexity & Heterogeneity in Dynamic Games
  • Carefully address unobserved heterogeneity in dynamic games through methods such as fixed effect conditional likelihood or functional differencing, as failing to do so can lead to biased estimates of structural parameters that capture both dynamic state dependence and strategic interactions among players. (Dobronyi, Gu, and Kim 2021)

  • Consider using Bayesian games, which allow for incomplete information and uncertainty, instead of traditional sequential-expectations models, which can become increasingly complex and difficult to manage as they require higher and higher orders of reciprocal expectations. (Harsanyi 1967)

>> Reputation-Based Strategies in Conflict Studies with Error
  • Consider incorporating reputation-based strategies in your studies of conflict, particularly when resources are valuable, communities are stable, and reputations are widely known but prone to some degree of error. (MCELREATH 2003)
>> Game Theoretical Models with Non-Monotonic Best Reply Dynamics
  • Consider applying lattice-theoretic tools to analyze games with non-monotonic best-replies, even if they were initially developed for games of strategic complements/substitutes, because these methods can still provide valuable insights about comparative statics and equilibrium properties. (Gama and Rietzke 2019)
>> Stochastic Equilibrium Analysis
  • Consider the possibility of stochastic equilibria in mean field games, as opposed to solely focusing on deterministic ones, as stochastic equilibria cannot always be reduced to randomizations among deterministic equilibria and may better capture the limiting dynamics of finite-player approximate Nash equilibria. (Lacker 2015)
>> Comparative Statics in Games with Incomplete Information
  • Carefully consider the implications of different stochastic dominance orders when conducting comparative static analysis in games of incomplete information, particularly in the context of first price and all pay auctions. (Hopkins and Kornienko 2007)

  • Carefully distinguish between “strongly competitive” and “weakly competitive” games of incomplete information, as the comparative statics predictions differ significantly between them. Specifically, in strongly competitive games, even weak types are motivated to play more aggressively in response to a stochastically higher distribution of types, whereas in weakly competitive games, weak types are discouraged and compete less aggressively in a more competitive environment. (Vives 2005)

>> Strategic Behavior Analysis with Endogeneity Considerations
  • Carefully consider the role of endogenous participation and accurately model it to ensure accurate counterfactual predictions when evaluating the impact of preference policies such as set-asides or subsidies. (Athey, Coey, and Levin 2013)

  • Compare the predicted monotonic relationship between investment and market size in the absence of entry-deterrence motives to the observed relationship in the data, and if they find evidence of non-monotonicity, it suggests that firms may be engaging in strategic entry-deterrence behavior. (Ellison and Ellison 2011)

>> Auctions and Allocation Mechanisms Design
  • Consider using a pseudo-market mechanism for allocating indivisible goods based on priorities, as it provides a well-defined, asymptotically incentive compatible, fair, and constrained Pareto efficient solution. (He et al. 2018)

  • Be aware that even seemingly impartial auction rules can produce highly discriminatory outcomes due to the presence of asymmetric equilibria, and therefore careful consideration of the specific auction design and its potential impact on participants is essential. (Deb and Pai 2017)

> Social Network Analysis & Behavioral Economics

>> Bayesian Modeling
  • Consider using a Bayesian approach to analyze the impact of learning and experimentation on decision-making processes, particularly in situations involving uncertainty and incomplete information. (Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman 1977)

  • Account for differences in opinions among market participants, as these differences drive trade volume and impact asset prices, rather than assuming homogenous beliefs. (NA?)

>> Common Ownership Measurement: Overlap vs Concentration
  • Carefully distinguish between the roles of overlapping ownership and relative investor concentration when measuring common ownership, as the latter explains a significant portion of the variation in the common ownership profit weights metric. (Backus, Conlon, and Sinkinson 2021)
>> Social Learning Dynamics in Complex Systems
  • Consider the impact of observational learning on consumer behavior, specifically how consumers decisions to investigate or purchase a product can be influenced by the choices of other consumers, leading to feedback effects that can amplify or diminish the success of a product. (Hendricks, Sorensen, and Wiseman 2012)

  • Carefully consider the impact of network topology on information aggregation, as the authors demonstrate that almost all reasonable social networks exhibit expanding observations, meaning that the probability of each individual observing the action of some individual from the recent past converges to one as the social network grows larger. This property, combined with unbounded private beliefs, is sufficient to ensure asymptotic learning in social networks. (Acemoglu et al. 2008)

> Information Disclosure Trade-Offs & Complexity in Experiments

>> Information Disclosure vs Noise Manipulation in School Rankings
  • Carefully consider the trade-offs between information disclosure and noise in transcripts when evaluating student ability, as schools may intentionally introduce noise to manipulate the distribution of desirabilities of positions to which your students are matched in the job market. (Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2010)
>> Balancing Simplicity and Realism in Lab Experiments
  • Consider conducting lab experiments that are complex enough to capture the main strategic tensions of a theory while being simple enough for participants to easily understand them, as demonstrated by the study investigating the unraveling predictions of voluntary information disclosure. (Jin, Luca, and Martin 2021)
>> Local Search Behavior Impacting Market Outcomes Post Policy Changes
  • Carefully consider the role of local search behavior in shaping the heterogeneous impact of information disclosure policies on market outcomes. (Luco 2019)

> Advanced Techniques for Analyzing Complex Systems

>> Bayesian Analysis for Newsvendor Problem with Uncertain Demand
  • Employ a Bayesian analysis with a non-informative prior to identify the optimal operational statistic for solving the newsvendor inventory control problem with uncertain demand. (Chu, Shanthikumar, and Shen 2008)
>> Combining IFT & MCS for Delayed Differentiation Analysis
  • Consider combining the advantages of the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) and Monotone Comparative Statics (MCS) approaches when analyzing complex systems involving delayed differentiation and uncertain market environments, as traditional methods may not be suitable for characterizing the impact of market size and firm productivity on the firms optimal policy. (Yang and Zhang 2022)
>> Monotonic Comparative Statics & Envelope Theorem Applications
  • Consider using the principle of monotone comparative statics and the generalized envelope theorem to simplify complex models involving collusion, such as the three-tier agency model, and derive clearer and more robust implications for corporate governance reform. (NA?)

> Macroeconomic Modeling with Realistic Constraints and Extensions

>> Considerations of Market Imperfections in Economic Models
  • Carefully consider the impact of storability on consumer behavior and seller strategies, especially in the presence of nonlinear pricing schemes, as it can lead to significant changes in consumption patterns and surplus extraction. (Hendel, Lizzeri, and Roketskiy 2014)

  • Carefully consider the impact of monetary policy responses when estimating the government expenditure multiplier in New Keynesian models, particularly when prices or wages are sticky and the zero lower bound is a binding constraint on monetary policy. (Woodford 2011)

>> Improving Labor Market Models through Heterogeneity and Endogenization
  • Consider extending existing models to endogenize previously excluded variables, such as the labor force participation rate, in order to better capture complex economic phenomena like the Great Recession. (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt 2015)

  • Leverage the power of “robust” comparative statics to analyze large dynamic economies, which provides generalizable insights into how stationary equilibria respond to exogenous shocks and changes in the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks, without requiring extensive simulation or numerical analysis. (Acemoglu and Jensen 2015)

  • Consider incorporating firm size heterogeneity into search and matching models with endogenous job destruction, as doing so can improve the models ability to explain various labor market phenomena, including the distributions of employer size and employment growth, cyclical fluctuations in worker flows, the negative comovement of unemployment and vacancies, and the dynamics of the distribution of employer size over the business cycle. (Elsby and Michaels 2013)

  • Consider incorporating a small risk of an economic disaster, following the work of Rietz (1988); Barro (2006); Gabaix (2012); and Gourio (2012), to better capture the possibility of a very large recession such as the Great Depression, and to examine its implications for business cycles. (Gourio 2013)

>> Incorporating Search Frictions and Endogeneity in Labor Markets
  • Consider incorporating endogenous processes, such as the impact of rising low-skill wages on the incentive to automate, in order to explain complex economic phenomena like increasing income inequality. (Hémous and Olsen 2022)

  • Carefully consider the role of search frictions and acceptance constraints in shaping participation decisions in skilled labor markets, as these factors can lead to counterintuitive comparative static properties and the possibility of underinvestment. (Bidner, Roger, and Moses 2016)

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Munther Dahleh, Ilan Lobel, and Asuman Ozdaglar. 2008. “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,” May. https://doi.org/10.3386/w14040.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Martin Kaae Jensen. 2015. “Robust Comparative Statics in Large Dynamic Economies.” Journal of Political Economy 123 (June). https://doi.org/10.1086/680685.
Athey, Susan, Dominic Coey, and Jonathan Levin. 2013. “Set-Asides and Subsidies in Auctions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5 (February). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.1.
Backus, Matthew, Christopher Conlon, and Michael Sinkinson. 2021. “Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (August). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190389.
Bidner, Chris, Guillaume Roger, and Jessica Moses. 2016. “Investing in Skill and Searching for Coworkers: Endogenous Participation in a Matching Market.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8 (February). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140110.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin S. Eichenbaum, and Mathias Trabandt. 2015. “Understanding the Great Recession.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7 (January). https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20140104.
Chu, Leon Yang, J.George Shanthikumar, and Zuo-Jun Max Shen. 2008. “Solving Operational Statistics via a Bayesian Analysis.” Operations Research Letters 36 (January). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2007.04.010.
Deb, Rahul, and Mallesh M. Pai. 2017. “Discrimination via Symmetric Auctions.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (February). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150121.
DellaVigna, Stefano, Ruben Durante, Brian Knight, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2016. “Market-Based Lobbying: Evidence from Advertising Spending in Italy.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8 (January). https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150042.
Dobronyi, Christopher, Jiaying Gu, and Kyoo il Kim. 2021. “Identification of Dynamic Panel Logit Models with Fixed Effects.” arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/ARXIV.2104.04590.
Ellison, Glenn, and Sara Fisher Ellison. 2011. “Strategic Entry Deterrence and the Behavior of Pharmaceutical Incumbents Prior to Patent Expiration.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3 (February). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.3.1.1.
Elsby, Michael W. L, and Ryan Michaels. 2013. “Marginal Jobs, Heterogeneous Firms, and Unemployment Flows.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5 (January). https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.5.1.1.
Gama, Adriana, and David Rietzke. 2019. “Monotone Comparative Statics in Games with Non-Monotonic Best-Replies: Contests and Cournot Oligopoly.” Journal of Economic Theory 183 (September). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.08.004.
Gourio, François. 2013. “Credit Risk and Disaster Risk.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5 (July). https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.5.3.1.
Grossman, Sanford J., Richard E. Kihlstrom, and Leonard J. Mirman. 1977. “A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing.” The Review of Economic Studies 44 (October). https://doi.org/10.2307/2296906.
Harsanyi, John C. 1967. “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, i–III Part i. The Basic Model.” Management Science 14 (November). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159.
He, Yinghua, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia, and Jianye Yan. 2018. “A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10 (August). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150259.
Hémous, David, and Morten Olsen. 2022. “The Rise of the Machines: Automation, Horizontal Innovation, and Income Inequality.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 14 (January). https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20160164.
Hendel, Igal, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Nikita Roketskiy. 2014. “Nonlinear Pricing of Storable Goods.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (August). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.3.1.
Hendricks, Kenneth, Alan Sorensen, and Thomas Wiseman. 2012. “Observational Learning and Demand for Search Goods.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4 (February). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.1.1.
Hopkins, Ed, and Tatiana Kornienko. 2007. “Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 7 (May). https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1366.
Jin, Ginger Zhe, Michael Luca, and Daniel Martin. 2021. “Is No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (May). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180217.
Lacker, Daniel. 2015. “A General Characterization of the Mean Field Limit for Stochastic Differential Games.” Probability Theory and Related Fields 165 (July). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-015-0641-9.
Lelarge, Marc. 2012. “Coordination in Network Security Games: A Monotone Comparative Statics Approach.” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 30 (December). https://doi.org/10.1109/jsac.2012.121213.
Luco, Fernando. 2019. “Who Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 11 (May). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170110.
MCELREATH, RICHARD. 2003. “Reputation and the Evolution of Conflict.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 220 (February). https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2003.3166.
Ostrovsky, Michael, and Michael Schwarz. 2010. “Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (May). https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.2.34.
Vives, Xavier. 2005. “Complementarities and Games: New Developments.” Journal of Economic Literature 43 (May). https://doi.org/10.1257/0022051054661558.
Woodford, Michael. 2011. “Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3 (January). https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.3.1.1.
Yang, Nan, and Renyu Zhang. 2022. “Comparative Statics Analysis of an Inventory Management Model with Dynamic Pricing, Market Environment Fluctuation, and Delayed Differentiation.” Production and Operations Management 31 (January). https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13538.